

15 April 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, CIA Publications Working Group  
SUBJECT : Repetition in OCI Reporting

1. The problem of repetition in OCI reporting derives primarily from the wide variety of current intelligence consumers whose many differing interests and demands OCI attempts to satisfy. While the quantity of intelligence provided these consumers is strictly limited to their needs or by their clearances, certain significant information must, when possible, be repeated to each and all or a distorted picture will result. Distorted pictures are in fact sometimes presented because of withholding of sensitive reports from certain publications, but this is by necessity not intent.

2. OCI issues regularly scheduled publications and a constantly increasing number of ad hoc situation reports and intelligence memoranda. These can be visualized as a pyramid insofar as their quantitative content and distribution. At the apex is the President's Daily Brief (PDB) which is the most highly distilled and sensitive of all. It must, however, always include certain essential intelligence or fail of its purpose in alerting the President to the most critical developments of the day. The items in the PDB, and usually most of those appearing in the somewhat less selective Central Intelligence Bulletin (CIB), almost invariably are repeated in all other publications, special reports and memoranda unless prohibited by security classification considerations. Thus it is that the voracious high-level intelligence consumer, who not only reads all or most or even several daily intelligence issuances but also receives special injections from selected cables and from oral briefings, gets a feeling he has heard a particular song too many times. It has to be assumed, however, that he is an exception and that by and large most consumers only get and read one publication.

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3. Reporting on the recent movement of two battalions of South Vietnamese marines from Saigon to Danang and back again is a good example of the question in case. For several days the whole tenure of the Ky government seemed to depend on whether and/or how these marines would be deployed against anti-government forces. Only the bare-bone facts and most tightly controlled reports on this situation were included in the PDB. Other published intelligence contained in varying degrees more detail but less sensitive material. However, all had per force to report on the marines at Danang and their potentially key role or be guilty of ignoring intelligence vital to an understanding of the most critical current development affecting our country's most critical foreign problem.

4. Attached is a list of OCI publications together with figures on their distribution.

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RICHARD LEHMAN

Acting Director of Current Intelligence

Attachment:

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